FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
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RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
Showing posts with label Election Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Election Law. Show all posts
Sunday, March 29, 2015
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case DIgest [G.R. No. 192474]
FACTS:
While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgement excluding Jalosjos from the list of voters in question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still the incumbent mayor.
Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.
Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was granted and his name was reinstated in the voter's list pending resolution of the petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied by the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance.
Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos won the elections and was proclaimed representative.
Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as representative for not satisfying the residency requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of Tampilisan.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
RULING:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent COMELEC En Banc’s order, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division resolution
While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgement excluding Jalosjos from the list of voters in question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still the incumbent mayor.
Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.
Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was granted and his name was reinstated in the voter's list pending resolution of the petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied by the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance.
Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos won the elections and was proclaimed representative.
Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as representative for not satisfying the residency requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of Tampilisan.
Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
RULING:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent COMELEC En Banc’s order, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division resolution
COMELEC v. Noynay Case Digest [G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]
FACTS:
Pursuant to a minute resolution by the COMELEC on October 29, 1996, nine informations for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.
In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, public respondent, presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
All the accused are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Motions for reconsiderations filed by the COMELEC have been denied. Petitioners then filed the instant petition.
In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.”
Public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.
RULING:
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the court held that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
Instant petition is GRANTED
Pursuant to a minute resolution by the COMELEC on October 29, 1996, nine informations for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with Branch 23 of the RTC of Allen, Northern Samar.
In an Order issued on August 25, 1997, public respondent, presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
All the accused are uniformly charged for Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Motions for reconsiderations filed by the COMELEC have been denied. Petitioners then filed the instant petition.
In its Manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General, it is “adopting” the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent “are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.”
Public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7691 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.
RULING:
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the court held that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
Instant petition is GRANTED
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Enrique B. Inting Case Digest [G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990]
FACTS:
On February 6, 1988, A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her to a very remote barangay and without prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.
After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was found.
On September 26, 1988, a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent court for violation of Sec. 261 Par. (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail at five thousand pesos (P 5, 000) as recomended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground that the Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Provincial Election Supervisor fifteen (15) days from receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Upon failure to comply with the order, the information was quashed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
RULING:
The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. The former, which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. The latter is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
The instant petition is GRANTED.
On February 6, 1988, A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her to a very remote barangay and without prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.
After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was found.
On September 26, 1988, a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent court for violation of Sec. 261 Par. (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail at five thousand pesos (P 5, 000) as recomended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground that the Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Provincial Election Supervisor fifteen (15) days from receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Upon failure to comply with the order, the information was quashed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
RULING:
The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. The former, which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. The latter is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
The instant petition is GRANTED.
People v. Delgado Case Digest [G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990]
FACTS:
COMELEC received reports agains private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a preliminary investigation on said report, The Provincial Election Supervisor found a prima facie case and recommended filing of an information against each respondents for violation of Sec. 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc, in a minute resolution, resolved to file information against the private respondents.
Informations were filed against the respondents in the RTC. The Regional Election Director was designated by COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of the service of the warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.
COMELEC prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that only the Supreme Court can review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not only the Supreme Court can review orders of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the respondent court has the authority to order the reinvestigation of the case and to order the COMELEC Law Department to furnish said respondent the records of the preliminary investigation of the case for the purpose of determining probable cause.
RULING:
First Issue
The Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to judicial review only by this Court.
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.
Second Issue
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.
The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Thus, Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this proceeding. The consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
COMELEC received reports agains private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a preliminary investigation on said report, The Provincial Election Supervisor found a prima facie case and recommended filing of an information against each respondents for violation of Sec. 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc, in a minute resolution, resolved to file information against the private respondents.
Informations were filed against the respondents in the RTC. The Regional Election Director was designated by COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of the service of the warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.
COMELEC prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that only the Supreme Court can review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not only the Supreme Court can review orders of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the respondent court has the authority to order the reinvestigation of the case and to order the COMELEC Law Department to furnish said respondent the records of the preliminary investigation of the case for the purpose of determining probable cause.
RULING:
First Issue
The Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to judicial review only by this Court.
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.
Second Issue
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.
The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Thus, Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this proceeding. The consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Friday, February 6, 2015
Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC Case DIgest (G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009)
FACTS:
In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period set forth by R.A. 8189.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and participate to the fullest extent in every national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
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