FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.
In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.
The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING:
First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.
Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.
In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third charge: Bigamy.
The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
