Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW): How to determine maximum and minimum penalties

(Act no 4103 as amended)

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory in all cases, EXCEPT if the accused will fall in any of the following exceptions:

1. if sentenced with a penalty of death or life imprisonment
2. if convicted of treason, conspiracy, proposal to commit treason
3. if convicted of misprision of treason, sedition, rebellion or espionage
4. if convicted of piracy
5. if the offender is a habitual delinquent
6. those who escaped from prison or evaded sentence
7. those who violated the terms of conditional pardon of the chief executive
8. where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year (important!)
9. if convicted by final judgement at the time of the effectivity of Act No. 4103
10. if penalized with suspension or distierro

If accused fall in any of the foregoing exceptions. DO NOT APPLY ISLAW!

ISLAW applies to offenses punished by Special Law and Revised Penal Code.

Why is ISLAW mandatory?

In the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the judge will get the maximum penalty and likewise the minimum penalty. If the accused was already able to serve the minimum term of his indeterminate sentence and upon the approval of the Board, the accused now becomes eligible for parole. ISLAW is favorable to the accused.

If the accused was granted parole and violated some conditions of the parole, What will happen?

A warrant of arrest will be issued by the court and the accused will be made to serve the rest of the remaining or unexpired portion of his sentence. (But in probation you go back to number 1, serving of sentence will be from the beginning)

Application of ISLAW:

How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Special Law:
1. The maximum penalty should NOT exceed the maximum provided for by that law.
2. The minimum penalty should NOT fall below the minimum provided by the law.

How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Revised Penal Code:
Example: In the crime of homicide, under the Revised Penal Code, the offender is sentenced to reclusion temporal.

The maximum penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is reclusion temporal. But reclusion temporal is a divisible penalty consisting of maximum, medium and minimum periods. Which period will we place the maximum term of the Indeterminate Sentence?

Guide for determining the maximum penalty:
1. Determine the entire range of the penalty
2. Determine if there is mitigating or aggravating circumstance

Which period will the maximum penalty be placed?

In pursuant to art 64, when there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, it should be placed at the medium period. Thus, the maximum penalty for the example above is reclusion temporal in the medium period.

What is the minimum penalty now?

In getting the minimum penalty, the rule is to simply get the penalty one (1) degree lower from the maximum penalty without taking into account the mitigating and aggravating circumstance. Thus, the penalty one degree lower from reclusion temporal, without taking into account any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is prision mayor. Prision mayor is now the minimum penalty for our example.

Important: If your maximum penalty is wrong, it follows that the minimum penalty will also be wrong.

Again, prision mayor is a divisible penalty. Which period can it be placed?
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it would depend upon the discretion of the court on which period to place it. Thus, the minimum penalty is prision mayor in any of its period.

Factors that could affect the imposition of minimum penalty:
1. Age
2. Conduct during trial
3. Mental or physical condition

Suppose in the example above, 1 aggravating circumstance was proven. What is now the maximum penalty?
It would still be reclusion temporal, but it shall be placed in the maximum period because of the presence of 1 aggravating circumstance.

How about the minimum penalty?
It would still be 1 degree lower from reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. In which period? It shall be discretionary upon the court.

(More examples)

1 mitigating but NO aggravating
maximum penalty: reclusion temporal in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision mayor in any period

2 mitigating, NO aggravating (privileged mitigating)
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the medium period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period

The preceding example is an exception to the rule. If there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we take it into account first in order to obtain the proper maximum penalty. Then, from that maximum penalty, we obtain the proper minimum penalty by getting the penalty 1 degree lower. Same rule applies as to the period of the minimum penalty.

Remember: It will never become a privileged mitigating circumstance if there is an aggravating circumstance present. 8 mitigating and 1 aggravating will never become privileged mitigating circumstance.

3 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period

In the preceding example, there are 3 mitigating circumstance present and no aggravating circumstance. The first two mitigating circumstance shall be a privileged mitigating circumstance. Thus, the penalty will be reduced by 1 degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor. The 3rd mitigating circumstance shall place the penalty in the minimum period.

4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the medium period (2 privileged circumstance. Thus we lower by 2 degrees)
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period

5 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period

At most we can only lower by 2 degrees. Thus, if there are 6 mitigating circumstance and NO aggravating:
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period

How is Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in complex crimes (Article 48)?
A complex crime is punished by the most serious offense and shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents.

Under the Revised Penal Code, falsification of public documents (Article 171) is a more serious offense punished by prision mayor than estafa (Article 315), punished only by prision correctional.

Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty for estafa through falsification of public documents shall be prision mayor in the maximum period. Minimum penalty shall be prision correctional, any period.

Suppose there was 1 mitigating circumstance proven. Maximum penalty would still be prision mayor in the maximum period. In pursuant to Article 48, even if there is a mitigating circumstance present, it should still be imposed at the maximum period.

How about if there are 2 mitigating circumstance and no aggravating?
The rule is, if it is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we lower by the penalty by one degree but still place it at the maximum period. Thus, the maximum penalty shall be prision correctional in the maximum period.

4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: arresto mayor in its maximum period

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1.    USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.    USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3.    USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.

4.    USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:

1.  A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)

   Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 64 Case Digest

FACTS:

Herein respondents Camilo Peña and Domingo Cajipe (and seven others) were administratively charged and investigated by a UP-PGH Investigating Committee   for “grave misconduct and dishonesty” and “infidelity in the custody of public documents" in their capacity as Assistant Cashier and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, respectively, of the PGH.

After several hearings, the Board of Regents adopted a resolution approving the report of the committee and fixing a penalty of dismissal for the respondents. Herein respondents then filed a petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to restrain the UP President from dismissing them and nullify the findings of the investigating committee. They claimed that, as civil service employees, the power to dismiss them did not belong to the UP President but to the Civil Service Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The respondents also filed a supplemental petition for injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the Director of the PGH as additional respondents. The trial court granted the both original and supplementary petition.

Herein petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals but the trial court's decision was sustained. Hence, the instant petition for Review by Certiorari by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

WON the dismissal of the respondents by the Board of Regents was final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.

RULING:

Legislature has established specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commissioner, by lodging in various entities, the power over their employees. One instance is the UP Charter, Section 6(e), which vested in the Board of Regents, the power to appoint, to fix employee compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing. The existence of these exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner is also confirmed by the Civil Service Law of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260).

Pursuant to the authority granted to the President of the Philippines by R.A. No. 51, PGH was transferred from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines by virtue of E.O. No. 94. The act of the Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees of the University. Had the intent been otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have excepted or reserved the disciplinary power of the Commissioner of the Civil Service over the transferred employees.

Ultimately, which is important is that the provisions of Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," as well as the due process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be fully observed and implemented; and the record is clear that in the case of herein respondents, no deficiency exists on this score. Pursuant to the express precept in the University charter [in its Section 6 (e)], the herein respondents were investigated by a committee of the University and the committee recommended their dismissal after mature deliberation. Before the proceedings were closed, these respondents manifested that they had no complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with the way the investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals also explicitly stated in its decision that it did not find any violation of the substantive rights of the respondents.

Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service Board of Appeals, or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does not in any way impair any of the substantial rights of the respondents. However, the autonomy necessary to the fulfillment of the educational and academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision of its authorities be made final as to its employees, there being no statutory or administrative provision to the contrary. Thus, the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

The writ of certiorari applied for is granted, and the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside.

AMBROSIO RONQUILLO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (614 SCRA 704) Case Digest

FACTS:

On September 8, 1988 at about 1:00 o’clock in the morning , Tomas Ronquillo upon arriving home from their poultry and copra dryer summoned his wife to open the door. Just as the wife did and Tomas was about to enter the house, the accused and brother of deceased, Ambrosio Ronquillo appeared from behind Tomas and stabbed him several times. Allegedly, Perlinda Ronquillo, wife of the accused, was also at the scene, and upon seeing that Tomas was still alive, commanded her husband to add more strike to the victim. The accused thereby complied with his wife’s command. The incident was also witnessed by the five year old daughter of the victim Snooky Ronquillo and Porieria Lingaya. Physician’s post mortem findings indicate that the victim suffered 4 stub wounds that resulted in acute blood loss and in the instantaneous death of the victim.

Accused admits having stabbed to death his brother but professed that he did it in self-defense. He testified that he was at home when, unexplainably, Tomas threw a piece of wood inside the house; that he picked up the wood and used it to parry the bolo thrusts of the victim; that the bolo fell from the victim’s hand; and that, seizing the bolo, he then stabbed the victim to death.

A case was filed at the Regional Trial Court of Lianga, Surigao, and upon evaluating the evidence, the accused, Ambrosio Ronquillo was found guilty, and his wife, Perlinda Ronquillo innocent of the crime charged. P30,000.00 was awarded for the indemnity of the life of the victim, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages and P6,000.00 for funeral and burial assistance.

Thus, the appeal to this Court.

ISSUES:

1.  Whether or not the court a quo erred in not appreciating self defense in favor of the accused;
2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding the accused guilty of murder instead of homicide since no qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was proven and neither was the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
3. Whether or not the court a quo erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance.

RULING:

1. The accused has the burden of substantiating the claim for self-defense. He must prove clearly and convincingly 3 elements, i.e. (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Based on the evidence submitted and the testimony of eyewitness Ponferia Lingaya, the Court finds that the court a quo was correct in rejecting the claim for self-defense.
2. The essence of treachery was sufficiently established by the prosecution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim depriving the latter any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring without risk its commission. In this case, the coming out from hiding behind the house of the victim instantly and without warning delivered the bolo thrust on the unwary victim.
3. The Court finds that aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be appreciated since it was not shown to have been deliberately sought by the accused. No such evidence has been presented and nocturnity is deemed ordinarily absorbed in trachery.

The decision of the lower court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to indemnify the heirs in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), in line with current jurisprudence.

Subsidiary Civil Liability (Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code)

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code deals with the subsidiary liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and proprietors of establishments.

Under paragraph 1 of Article 102, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and proprietors of establishments are subsidiarily liable when all of the following elements are present:

1. The innkeeper, tavernkeepers, and proprietor of establishments or his employee committed a violation of a municipal ordinance or some general or police regulation.

2. A crime is committed in such inn, tavern or establishment.

3. The person criminally liable is insolvent.

In the second paragraph of Article 102, when all of the following elements are present, the innkeeper is subsidiarily liable:

1. The guests have notified in advance the innkeeper or the person representing him of the deposit of their goods within the inn.

2. The guests have followed the direction of the innkeeper or his representative with respect to the care and vigilance of their goods.

3. Such goods of the guests lodging in therein were taken by robbery or theft

Even if the guests did not deposit their goods and a notice of disclaimer of liability was posted in a hotel, it does not free the owner from subsidiary liability. It is enough that the goods were stolen within the inn.

Civil Liability in Certain Cases (Article 101 of the Revised penal Code)

Article 101 Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

Civil liability for:

a. insane or imbecile

b. person under 15 years old

c. person who is over 15 but under 18 who has acted without discernment

Shall devolve upon those having such a person under their legal authority or control, UNLESS it appears that there was NO fault or negligence on their part.

In default thereof, civil liability shall be taken from the property of the insane, imbecile or minor, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Under the Child and Youthful Welfare Code, civil liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon:

1. The father or,

2. The mother or,

3. Upon the guardian,

4. Relatives or friends of the family

There is NO civil liability for:

a. Injuries caused by mere accident

b. Failure to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause

The final discharge of a minor in conflict with the law does NOT extinguish his civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense.

Civil liability for persons who, in order to avoid evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another (Subdivision 4 of Article 11)

a. Civil liability shall be in proportion to the benefit which they may have received

b. The court shall determine proportionate amount

c. When the shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, whenever damage has been caused with the consent of authorities and their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulation.

The person civilly liable is the person who was able to benefit from the act which caused damage to another.

Who are civilly liable for acts committed by persons acting under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear?

1. The persons using the violence or causing the fear, or if there is none;

2. The person doing the act.

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest

The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest

FACTS:

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that  It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.  Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.  However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.  But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.  On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.  Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.  The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.  By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.  Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. 

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”  Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.