BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 (Case Digest)

FACTS:

The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages by BPI against Dando before the RTC.Dando availed of a loan in the amount of P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), BPI's predecessor in interest. Dando defaulted in the payment and despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.

After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. The RTC issued a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. 

Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on time while BPI filed its Pre-trial Breif with the RTC and furnished Dando with a copy thereof on the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. Dando then moved for the dismmissal of the case on the ground of late filing of the Pre-trial Brief. RTC granted Dando’s Motion to Dismiss.

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC which reconsidered and set aside it former order. Dando filed a Motion for Reconsideration

but was denied.

Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. CA held that BPI's excuse is too flimsy to justify the reversal of an earlier order dismissing the action.  The BPI did not come forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation of the rules, or has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules. The RTC decision was ANNULLED and SET ASIDE by the CA.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

RULING:

It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory.  Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word “shall” is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.

x x x However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.  Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. x x x This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.  Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions.  In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.  For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as:  (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e)  a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

x x x The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI. To dismiss the case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.

x x x BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules.  In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set the case for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing the case.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial.  Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of the case, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

Negative Pregnant Denial

A denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

ZENAIDA POLANCO, et al vs. CARMEN CRUZ, represented by her attorney-in-fact, VIRGILIO CRUZ G.R. No. 182426 February 13, 2009 (Case Digest)

FACTS:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent Carmen Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for allegedly destroying her palay crops.  While admitting that petitioners own the agricultural land she tilled, respondent claimed she was a lawful tenant thereof and had been in actual possession when petitioners maliciously filled so with soil and palay.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners simultaneously filed an Answer to the complaint and a Motion for Reconsideration.  The court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit.  However, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case due to respondent’s failure to prosecute.

With the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which granted the appeal.

CA ruled that, since filing the Complaint, respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, an Answer to petitioners’ counterclaim, and a Comment to petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration; that respondent did not ignore petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss nor did she repeatedly fail to appear before the court; that no substantial prejudice would be caused to petitioners and that strict application of the rule on dismissal is unjustified considering the absence of pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case on the part of respondent; and that justice would be better served if the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and final disposition

Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration; hence, this petition.

Petitioners allege that respondent failed to comply with the mandate of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to promptly move for the setting of the case for pre-trial; that “heavy pressures of work” does not justify the failure to move for the setting of the case for pre-trial;

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS NULLIFYING AND/OR REVERSING AND/OR SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE RTC-BULACAN IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to promptly move ex parte to have the case set for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed.  Moreover, Section 3, Rule 17 provides that failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with said duty without any justifiable cause may result to the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules of procedure.

It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the dismissal of respondent’s complaint is too severe a sanction for her failure to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial.  It must be pointed out that respondent prosecuted her action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch since filing the complaint – she filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint; a comment to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order of the trial court; and an Answer to Counterclaim of petitioners.  When the trial court issued an order dismissing the case, respondent filed without delay a motion for reconsideration; and upon its denial, she immediately filed a Notice of Appeal. Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ claim that respondent was silent for one year since she filed her Answer to Counterclaim until the trial court’s dismissal order, records show that between said period, both parties and the trial court were threshing out petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order.

x x x unlike the respondents in the said case, herein respondent never failed to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the trial court at any other time.  Failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and only technical lapse during the entire proceedings.  Neither has she manifested an evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.  Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial.  Besides, petitioners would not be prejudiced should the case proceed as they are not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. Indeed, on several occasions, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their cases.  This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.  Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.

Finally, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the new Guidelines To Be Observed By Trial Court Judges And Clerks Of Court In The Conduct Of Pre-Trial And Use Of Deposition-Discovery Measures, which took effect on August 16, 2004, aims to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999.  A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC states that: “Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.”  As such, the clerk of court of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos should issue a notice of pre-trial to the parties and set the case for pre-trial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED