Tuesday, July 29, 2014

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999] Case Digest

FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. 

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:
  1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
  2. Sales Invoice;
  3. Delivery Receipt; and
  4. Tally Sheets.


Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit. 

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against petitioners.





PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001] Case Digest

FACT:

On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.

Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the  Philippine Coast Guard. According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the integrity of said evidence.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.

Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order. Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.

RULING:

The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed for lack of merit.

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla, respondents Case Digest (349 SCRA 483)

This petition for review seeks for reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name.

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it. 

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of the petitioners.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for the revocation and cancellation of its title.

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:

What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?

RULING:

Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.

DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.

Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.

Garingan vs. Garingan Case Digest (455 SCRA 480)

FACTS:

Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, et al., herein respondents, alleged that their grandfather Sauri Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully panted with coconut and other fruit bearing trees, containing an area of 11.3365 hectares. Saupi Moro acquired the land through purchase from Gani Moro. Saupi Moro then donated the land to his daughter Insih Saupi, mother of Hadji Munib, et al. and petitioner Haymaton S. Garingan.

After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954, Haymaton and and husband Pawaki, who was also known as Djayari Moro, herein petitioners, took over the administration of the land. Later, petitioners declared the land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation purposes. Petitioners refused to share with the respondents the income from the sale of fruits from the land. Petitioners claimed that on 22 September 1969, Pawaki alleged that he bought the land from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin (Jikirum) and a TCT was issued in the name of Djayari Moro. Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept of an owner in the same year. He declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675.

Respondents filed an action for Partition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against petitioners with the Shari'a District Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City. The Shari'a District Court then ordered to partition the land in equal shares among the respondents and their sister petitioner. Each of them was entitled to one-fourth share of the aforesaid property. The TCT in the name of Djayari Moro was ordered annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City was ordered to issue a new TCT in the names of the respondents and their sister petitioner. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated 19 July 2000.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Shari'a District Court erred in ordering the partition of the subject property and annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis alone of respondents' claim that Saupi Moro, their predecessor-in-interest, was the one who owned the said parcel of land during his lifetime, thereby disregarding the protection accorded to the persons dealing with property registered under the Torrens system.


RULING:

The petition is meritorious. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership, and the action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the property in dispute. In the case at bar, Hadji Munib, et al., herein respondents, failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.

The subject property originally belonged to Gani Moro and was acquired through sale by Saupi Moro. After Gani Moro's death, his heirs, including Andaang, offered to repurchase the land, but Saupi Moro refused. The heirs instituted a civil case for Unlawful Detainer but was dismissed by the court. Despite the dismissal, Andaang filed for a homestead patent over the said property. It was approved on 17 February 1955 and he was issued Letters of patent. On 6 December 1955, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in Andaang's name. In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed a civil case for the annulment of the OCT and damages against Andaang. Again, the case did not prosper. The plaintiffs did not revive the case and it was considered abandoned.

Andaang died intestate in 1959. On 13 April 1960, Andaang's widow and sole heir, Cristeta Santiago vda. de Gani, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale adjudicating to herself the land in dispute and at the same time selling it to Jikirum. Consequently, a TCT was issued in the name of Jikirum.

CA 141 requires the applicant for a homestead patent, to enter in possession of, improve and cultivate the land. Petitioners, insist that Andaang did not comply with these requirements. A person deprived of the land, estate, or interest therein by virtue of a decree of registration may avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496. Section 38, however, contemplates of an external fraud. In the case of Libudan vs. Gil, the Court explained the scope of external or collateral fraud as any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of the case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case". The fraud being attributed to Andaang is not extrinsic and collateral.

Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and collateral fraud, respondents failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period. In Nelayan, et al. vs. Nelayan, et al., this Court ruled that in the case of public land grants (patents), the one-year period under Section 38 counted from the issuance of the patent by the government.

Upon registration, the land in dispute falls under the operation of Act 496 and becomes a registered land. A homestead patent, once registered, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. Instead of availing the remedy of Section 38 of Act 496, respondents filed an action for partition, which must fail because a Torrens title is not susceptible to collateral attack.

In any event, the respondents are not the proper parties to file the action for reconveyance of the land in dispute. In the civil cases, respondents did not claim that the land was privately owned and thus not proper for homestead application. They only alleged continuous possession of the land. The respondents acknowledged that the Illegal Detainer case filed by the heirs of Gani Moro, only confirmed Saupi Moro's physical possession of the land. This, however, did not settle the issue of ownership of the land.

Evidently, the land was not privately owned by Gani Moro from whom Saupi Moro acquired it. The land in dispute was part of public domain before the issuance of OCT in the name of Andaang. If it were otherwise, there would be no need for Andaang to file a homestead application.

Respondents' action for partition effectively seeks to cancel the homestead patent and the corresponding certificate of title. However, even if the homestead patent and the certificate of title were cancelled, respondents will not acquire the land in the concept of an owner. The land will revert to the government and will again form part of the public domain. The proper party to bring such action of patent cancellation is the Government. This is provided for in Section 101 of CA 141.

Considering the foregoing, the respondents is not the proper party to file an action to recover possession of the land in dispute. Further, they failed to timely avail of whatever remedy available to them to protect whatever interest they had over the land.

The decision of the Shari'a District Court is set aside and another one is entered dismissing the said complaint.


Sunday, July 13, 2014

Bonite vs. Zosa Case Digest (162 SCRA 173)

This is a petition for a review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, dated 25 of February 1971, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order dated 27 March 1971 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.

FACTS:

On the 24 of September 1968, Florencio Bonite was hit by a truck driven by private respondent. As a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. A criminal complaint for homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga. Petitioners through their counsel, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.

After trial on the merits, the court acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused for the death of Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III. The court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages on 25 February 1971. In its ruling, the court held that since the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file and independent civil action, and the fact that they have been represented by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case, the action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already res adjudicata. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was denied.

Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.


RULING:
Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused in a criminal case, where the acquittal is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted and requires only a preponderance of evidence. This is pursuant to the express provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code. 

In the case at bar, the criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages

The court held that the petitioners may also base such separate civil action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Acquital of the accused from the charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for the recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damage in both scores (delict and quasi-delict).

Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite to file a civil action from damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. When the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.

Contrary to private respondent's claim, Article 33 of the Civil Code cannot apply in this case for it assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code punishes the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted under said article. It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at bar.

The court a quo's ruling that the petitioners did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action is without merit. Article 29 does not include any reservation requirement to institute an independent civil action. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the latter's acquittal in the criminal case based on reasonable doubt. The reservation requirement of the Rules on Criminal Procedure has also been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. This provision has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declaring such requirement of reservation as ineffective.

Petitioners active participation in the prosecution of the criminal action does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code.

The Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the court a quo was reversed and set aside, and a new one is entered reinstating the action for recovery of damages by the petitioners and directing the said court to proceed trial with the case.

Sunday, July 6, 2014

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. 

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. 

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.


Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.


Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. 

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Thursday, July 3, 2014

Menguito vs. Republic Case Digest (G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000)

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC of Pasig City, granting the application for registration of the lands in question to the petitioners.


FACTS:

On November 10, 1987, an application for Registration of Title was filed with the RTC of Pasig City by herein petitioners who were successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Froilan Menguito and Generoso Menguito.The petitioners sought to have parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered, conformed and be declared as owners in fee simple of said parcels of land. The petitioners also asked the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land through inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants and their predecessors-in-interest in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their application, opted to apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case.

Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a notice of hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of adjacent properties as mentioned in the application. The hearing was scheduled on April 25, 1989.The addressees were then ordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.'

The Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application for registration contending that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, according to the Solicitor General, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for and the said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further contends that  the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990. The Solicitor General claimed that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

On April 25, 1989, at the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application.

The lower court then issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’ together with documentary exhibits. 

On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. In the manifestation, it objected to the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving and the tax declarations for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. the oppositor Republic also objected to the tax receipts submitted by the applicants, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It also objected to the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito submitted by the applicants as being self-serving and a mere photocopy. The first page of the Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants was also claimed by the oppositors as self-serving and mere photocopy. The second page of said deed was also attacked as referring to different parcels of land other than those being applied for. Oppositor respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.

On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision affirming the order of general default against the whole world and confirming the registerable title of the  applicants.

On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the lower court decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the decision was reversed due to the failure of the lower court to consider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition.


ISSUES:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.


RULING:

The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, the petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: : (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that petitioners failed to establish this two requisites.

Petitioners relied on a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. This proof is insufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." The petitioners must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain.

If the land was indeed alienable, petitioners still needs to establish possession of the lots in question in an open, continuous, exclusive and adverse in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945. Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War.  There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim. Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim.  General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.

Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses because they could have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito and they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their supposed claim. However, they were not presented as witnesses. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Tax declarations, tax receipts and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments presented in evidence by the petitioners were incompetent and insufficient because they are of recent vintage.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.