This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC of Pasig City, granting the application for registration of the lands in question to the petitioners.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1987, an application for Registration of Title was filed with the RTC of Pasig City by herein petitioners who were successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Froilan Menguito and Generoso Menguito.The petitioners sought to have parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered, conformed and be declared as owners in fee simple of said parcels of land. The petitioners also asked the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land through inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants and their predecessors-in-interest in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their application, opted to apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case.
Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a notice of hearing addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of adjacent properties as mentioned in the application. The hearing was scheduled on April 25, 1989.The addressees were then ordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.'
The Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application for registration contending that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, according to the Solicitor General, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for and the said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further contends that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990. The Solicitor General claimed that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
On April 25, 1989, at the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application.
The lower court then issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’ together with documentary exhibits.
On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. In the manifestation, it objected to the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving and the tax declarations for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. the oppositor Republic also objected to the tax receipts submitted by the applicants, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It also objected to the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito submitted by the applicants as being self-serving and a mere photocopy. The first page of the Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants was also claimed by the oppositors as self-serving and mere photocopy. The second page of said deed was also attacked as referring to different parcels of land other than those being applied for. Oppositor respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.
On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision affirming the order of general default against the whole world and confirming the registerable title of the applicants.
On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the lower court decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.
On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the decision was reversed due to the failure of the lower court to consider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, the petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: : (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that petitioners failed to establish this two requisites.
Petitioners relied on a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. This proof is insufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." The petitioners must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain.
If the land was indeed alienable, petitioners still needs to establish possession of the lots in question in an open, continuous, exclusive and adverse in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945. Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim. Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.
Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses because they could have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito and they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their supposed claim. However, they were not presented as witnesses. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Tax declarations, tax receipts and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments presented in evidence by the petitioners were incompetent and insufficient because they are of recent vintage.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
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