FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999] Case Digest

FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. 

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:

1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
2. Sales Invoice;
3. Delivery Receipt; and
4. Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit. 

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against petitioners.

PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001] Case Digest

FACT:

On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.

Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the  Philippine Coast Guard. According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the integrity of said evidence.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.

Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order. Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.

RULING:

The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed for lack of merit.

Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla, respondents Case Digest (349 SCRA 483)

This petition for review seeks for reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name.

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it. 

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of the petitioners.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for the revocation and cancellation of its title.

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES:

What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?

RULING:

Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.

DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.

Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.