USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1.    USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.    USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3.    USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.

4.    USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:

1.  A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)

   Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest

The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest

FACTS:

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that  It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.  Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.  However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.  But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.  On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.  Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.  The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.  By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.  Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. 

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”  Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (36 SCRA 228) Case Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He alleged that respondent Commission on Elections gave his certificate of candidacy due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and loud speakers. According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case against Commission on elections seeking a writ of prohibition and at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act.

Issues: 

Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the petitioner?

Ruling: 

Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.

The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles.

SHIGENORI KURODA vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI (83 Phil 171) Case Digest

Facts:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines is charged before the military commission with war crimes. The petitioner tenders that National War Crimes Office established by Executive Order 68 has no jurisdiction over his case since the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention. He also claimed that Melville Hussey and Robert Port are not attorneys authorized to practice law in the Philippines and that they do not have personality as prosecution since the United Stated is not a pary in interest in the case. 

Issue: 

Is Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention? 

Ruling: 

The Supreme Court held that the order is valid and constitutional in pursuant to Section 3 Article 2 of the Constitution.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part and are wholly based on generally accepted principles of international law. Such rules and procedures therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed in the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. This rights and obligations were not erased by the assumption of full sovereignty.

Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the rules of court. There is nothing in the said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before the said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Petition is DENIED.

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (148 SCRA 659) Case Digest

Facts:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. 

Issue: 

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?  

Ruling: 

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest

Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? 

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 151445) Case Digest

Facts:

 

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:

Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling:

The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise. 

The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. 

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of “Balikatan-02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part.

The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

ALFREDO M. DE LEON vs. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602) Case Digest

Facts:

In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B. Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Issue:

Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:

The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.

Wherefore, the designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of petitioners’ position subject of this petition.