SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest

FACTS:

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that  It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.  Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.  However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.  But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.  On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.  Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.  The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.  By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.  Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. 

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”  Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

MANUEL G. VILLATUYA v. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 Case Digest

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

In a mandatory conference called for by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, complainant and his counsel, and the respondent appeared and submitted issues for resolution. The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.

In the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a result of his work and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.

In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms. Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts of respondent wherein he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.

On January 16, 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that he was not given the opportunity to controvert them. He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. He also informed the Commission that he filed Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions.

The Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. Respondent moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against him, pending outcome of petition for nullification he filed with RTC, but was denied. The Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.

On February 27, 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

On August 1, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated April 15, 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant;

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.

RULING:

First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.

Supreme Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients.

In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, the Supreme Court affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

Third charge: Bigamy.

The Supreme Court have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Rebecca B. Arnobit vs. Atty Ponciano P. Arnobit, A.C. No. 1481, October 17, 2008

Facts:

Rebecca B. Arnobit, filed an affidavit-complaint, praying that the Court exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.

Complainant and respondent were married with 12 children. Several years after passing the bar,  respondent left the conjugal dwelling and cohabited with Benita Buenafe, a married woman, who bore him 4 more children. Rebecca filed a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case of adultery against respondent and Benita later followed.

Respondent denied the allegation that he cohabited with Benita. Instead, he alleged that it was Rebecca who was the cause of their separation due to her frequent travels around the country without his consent and thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family.

Hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor General and subsequently, before the IBP-CBD. Complainant presented both oral and documentary evidence to support her allegations of abandonment and immorality, 2 witnesses and affidavits from NBI agents to show the existence of prima facie case for adultery. Respondent, however, failed to present evidence to support his claim and failed to personally attend hearings.

The Commission found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law to the IBP Board Governors for 3 months. It was accepted and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Issues:

Does leaving the conjugal home and cohabiting with a married woman a ground for disbarment?

Ruling:

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct: CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138,9 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED

Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007

Facts:

Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a residential house few blocks away from the church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene.

Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit.

Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct?

Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Family Code (Chapter 1: Requisites of Marriage)

Marriage is a special contract because:

• It can only be entered into by a man and a woman
• It does NOT expire
• Its nature, consequence and incidents are governed by law and NOT subject to stipulation except for marriage settlements that may fix property relations

Who may contract marriage?

• Any male or female of the age 18 or upwards with no legal impediments.

Two (2) Essential Requisites of marriage are:

• Legal capacity to marry of the contracting parties
• Consent freely given by the contracting parties in the presence of a solemnizing officer

Three (3) Formal Requisites of marriage are:

• Authority of the solemnizing officer
• Valid marriage license
• Marriage ceremony with both parties personally present, solemnized by an authorized solemnizing officer in the presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age

What is the effect on the marriage of the absence of any of the formal or essential requisites?

• It will render the marriage void ab initio.

What is the effect on the marriage of a defect in any of the essential requisites?

• It will render the marriage voidable.

What is the effect on the marriage of an irregularity in the formal requisites?

• Marriage would still be valid but the party or parties responsible for said irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Who may solemnize a marriage?

• A judge (incumbent not retired) within the jurisdiction of his court.
• Priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church and registered with the civil registrar general provided that at least one of the contracting party belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect.
• A ship captain or airplane chief in cases of articulo mortis and the contracting parties are either passenger or crew of the ship or plane during its voyage.
• A military commander (at least 2nd lieutenant) of a unit (battalion), where a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, in cases of articulo mortis where the contracting parties, civilian or military are within the zone of military operation.
• Any consul general, consul, vice-consul in cases where Filipino citizens abroad want to contract marriage in accordance with the Philippine laws, shall assume the duties of the local civil registrar and solemnizing officer.
• Mayors or Acting Mayors , in default thereof, the Vice Mayor or any highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan can solemnize marriage in pursuant to the Local Government Code.

Where can marriages be solemnized?

• In open court, church, chapel, temple.
• In the Office of consul-general, consul or vice-consul for Filipino citizens who wish to be married abroad under the Philippine laws and shall be solemnized by consul-general, consul or vice-consul.
• In a house or place designated by the contracting parties but within the jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer if they so request the latter in writing.
• In cases of marriage in articulo mortis:

a)      In a ship or airplane during its voyage where contracting parties are passengers or crew members. It shall be solemnized by the ship captain or airplane pilot only.

b)      In a Zone of Military Operation whether parties are civilian or members of armed forces. It shall be solemnized by a military commander of a battalion in the absence of a chaplain.

What are the requirements of a marriage ceremony?

• The contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate signed by the contracting parties and the witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
• In case of marriage in articulo mortis, when the party who is at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage contract, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to write the name of said party. This fact will be attested by the solemnizing officer.
• There is no prescribed form or religious rite required for the solemnization of marriage. 

Who can issue a marriage license?

• The Local Civil Registrar where either of the contracting parties habitually resides.
• Consul-general, consul or vice-consul for marriages contracted abroad.

What shall be required of the contracting parties in applying for a marriage license?

• The parties shall file a separately sworn application for marriage license with either of the following requirements: (in order of priority)

1)      Original birth certificate or a copy certified by persons having custody of original

2)      Baptismal certificates or a copy certified by persons having custody of original

3)      Current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths witnessed by two persons of legal age. The nearest kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality.

4)      Parents of the contracting parties appear shall personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties.

5)      Local civil registrar can personally look at the applicants and be convinced that either or both of them are of required age.

• If previously married the local civil registrar shall require either:

·         Death certificate of dead spouse or, in default thereof, an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and the party’s civil status and the name and date of death of deceased spouse, or

·         Judicial decree of absolute divorce, or

·         Judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity

• If any of the contracting party is between ages 18 and above but below 21, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage:

·         Consent to their marriage by father, mother, surviving parent or guardian or persons having legal charge of them in the order mentioned shall be required by the local civil registrar. An absence of this requirement will render the marriage annullable. Consent can be manifested in writing by the interested party or in the form of an affidavit.

• If any of the contracting party is between ages 21 and above but below 25:

·         They are obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage.

·         They are also required to undergo marriage counseling conducted by an authorized solemnizing officer or a counselor duly accredited  by the proper government agency.

If they do not obtain consent, or if it be unfavorable, or if they do not undergo counseling, the marriage license shall not be issued till after 3 months following the completion of publication of the application of marriage license. If only one of the party is required to submit the requirements mentioned, the other party must still be present at the counseling.

• Citizens of a foreign country are required to submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry issued by their respective diplomatic or consular offices.

• For a stateless person or refugees from other countries, they shall be required to submit an affidavit stating the circumstance showing such capacity to contract marriage.

• Payment of prescribed fees for non-indigent parties otherwise its free.

What is the validity of the marriage license?

• It shall be valid anywhere in the Philippines but only for 120 days from the date of issue.

What is a notice of application for marriage license and why is it important?

• It is a notice prepared by the local civil registrar after receiving properly filled up marriage application, which contain the full names and residences and other relevant information about the contracting parties applying for a marriage license.

• It is necessary to inform the public of the impending marriage so that if anyone knows of any legal impediment to the said application, it can be reported to the local civil registrar.

How long is the publication?

• 10 consecutive days.

Where shall the notice of application for marriage license be published?

• It shall be posted on a bulletin board outside of the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place and accessible to the general public.

What happens to the application if any impediment is known by the local civil registrar or is brought to his attention?

• The local civil registrar shall note down the particulars thereof and his finding thereon but shall nonetheless issue the license after the completion of the period of publication unless ordered by a competent court .

What are the duties of the solemnizing officer?

1)      Furnish either of the contracting parties the original marriage certificate.

2)      Send duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than 15 days after the marriage to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.

3)      Retain a quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate and the original marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in this title of the Family Code.

What are the duties of the local civil registrar?

1)      Prepare the documents required by this title.

2)      Administer oaths without charge.

3)      Recording of all applications for marriage licenses in a registry book strictly in the order which the same are received.

Additional Notes:

• All marriages solemnized abroad in accordance with their laws shall also be valid in the Philippines except those marriages which are void ab initio as provided in this Code.
• Divorce is recognized by the family code but only in marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner where the alien spouse obtained a divorce abroad. In such cases, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
• For purposes of remarriage:

1)      A foreigner must file a petition for change of status if he was previously married in the Philippines.

2)      For a Filipino citizen, judicial declaration of nullity is required.

Psychological Incapacity

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995

• Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by

a)      gravity,

b)      juridical antecedence, and

c)       incurability

• Psychological Incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support

• The intendment of the law is to confine psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of utter  insensitivity or inability  to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

• Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological incapcity. 

• Root cause of psychological incapacity must be

a)      medically or clinically identified,

b)      alleged in the complaint,

c)       sufficiently proven by experts, and

d)      clearly expained in the decision

• The incapacity must be proven to be existing “at the time of the celebration” marriage. 

• Such incapacity must be shown to be medically and clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related  to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job

• Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage (Art 68-71 & Art 220-225). The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

• The foregoing guidelines in Santos v. Court of Appeals do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.